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The  translation of  citizen votes into legislative seats is of  cen- 
tral  importance  in democratic electoral systems.  It  has  been a longstanding concern 
among scholars in political science and in numerous other disciplines. Throughout this 
literature, two fundamental  tenets of  democratic theory, partisan  bias and democratic 
representation, have often been confused. We  develop a general statistical model of  the 
relationship  between  votes  and  seats  and  separate  these  two important  concepts 
theoretically  and  empirically.  In  so  doing,  we also  solve  several  methodological 
problems with the study of  seats, votes, and the cube law. An application to U.S. con- 
gressional  districts provides  estimates  of  bias and  representation for  each state  and 
demonstrates the model's  utility.  Results  of  this  application  show  distinct  types of 
representation coexisting in U.S. states. Although most states have small partisan biases, 
there are some with a substantial degree of  bias. 
The  relationship 
between legislative seats and citizen votes 
is a longstanding concern in democratic 
theory  (e.g.,  Balinski  and Young  1982; 
Dahl 1956, 147-49;  Farrand 1911; Locke 
1965, 419-20;  Rae 1967; Schattschneider 
1942). Through .this relationship, legisla- 
tive majorities are formed and minorities 
protected. Constitutionally mandated re- 
apportionment and  shifting patterns  of 
partisanship have  created  opportunities 
for state legislatures and partisan gerry- 
manders to alter the congressional seats- 
votes relationship (Cain 1984; Grofman et 
al. 1982; Polsby 197l). Over the last cen- 
tury, scholars in political science, sociol- 
ogy,  economics,  mathematics,  statistics, 
and  political  geography  have  studied 
these normative theoretical questions and 
sought  empirical  estimates  of  bias  and 
unfairness (Hay and Rumley 1984; Ken- 
dall  and  Stuart  1950;  March  1957-58; 
Theil1970; Tufte 1973). Furthermore, the 
recent  spate  of  court  challenges,  the 
courtsf willingness to hear political gerry- 
mandering  cases,  and  the  Supreme 
Court's interest in a threshold of  political 
discrimination, have rekindled the seats- 
votes controversy (Karcher v.  Daggett, 
462 U.S.  725 [1983]; Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S.  [1986]; Brown v. Thomson, 462 
U.S. 835 119831). 
Concern with and, we believe, confu- 
sion  over  two  fundamental  tenets  of 
democratic  theory,  partisan  bias  and 
democratic representation, dominate this 
literature. Partisan bias introduces asym- 
metry  into the  seats-votes relationship, 
resulting in an unfair partisan differential 
in the ability to win legislative seats: the 
advantaged party will be able to receive a 
larger number of  seats for a fixed number 
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of  votes  than  will  the  disadvantaged 
party. Although bias is easily defined, it 
is  not  always as apparent  or  as easily 
measured  (Grofman 1983). Even  in  the 
absence of  partisan bias, several forms of 
democratic  representation  are  possible: 
strict  proportional  representation-in 
which the percentage of  seats equals the 
percentage of  votes-and  winner-take-all 
elections are the pure forms, with many 
other possibilities in between.'  Whereas 
the extent of  bias is a separate problem, 
the precise effect of  partisan bias depends 
on  the  specific  form  of  democratic 
representation. 
Much of  the literature either treats par- 
tisan bias and democratic representation 
as one concept or mistakenly confuses dif- 
ferent democratically legitimate forms of 
representation with clearly invidious par- 
tisan  bias.  Because  bias  and  represen- 
tation  are related,  the  separate estima- 
tions in most  previous research can be 
shown to be statistically inconsistent. By 
expressing each  of  these  concepts as a 
separate parameter in a unified model, we 
show  that  it  is  possible and  useful  to 
emphasize  the  analytical and  empirical 
distinctions by  developing a model that 
jointly  estimates both  of  these  parame- 
ters. In a single and conceptually simple 
equation, we incorporate the full range of 
possible values for bias and representa- 
tion. The result is a general form that is 
useful in understanding both the fairness 
of  legislative  reapportionment  and  the 
democratic character of  legislative repre- 
sentation. The validity and utility of  this 
model is then demonstrated  with an appli- 
cation to state level  congressional seats 
and votes for the period 1950-84. 
The essence of  bias and representation 
in  democratic regimes is realized  in  the 
translation of  votes into seats.'  Assume 
initially that there are only two parties, 
Democratic and Republican, and that the 
legislature is composed of  a set of  single- 
member,  winner-take-all  districts.  We 
begin with a few standard definitions. Let 
v  =  the  number  of  votes  cast  for 
Democratic party candidates 
T  =  the total number of  votes cast for 
candidates of  both parties 
VR  =  T -  v = the number of  votes 
cast  for  Republican  party  can- 
didates 
V  = v/T = the proportion  of  votes 
cast for Democratic candidates 
VR  = 1 -  V = the proportion of  votes 
cast for Republican candidates 
s  =  the number of  seats allocated to 
the Democratic party candidates 
SR  =  the number of  seats allocated to 
the Republican party candidates 
D  =  the  total  number  of  single- 
member legislative districts 
S  = s/D = the proportion  of  seats 
allocated to the Democratic can- 
didates 
SR =  1 -  S = the proportion of  seats 
allocated to the RepubIican can- 
didates 
We express the absence of  partisan bias 
as partisan  symmetry.  In  general,  this 
means that in an election system where 
x% of  the Democratic votes produces an 
allocation of  y% of  the seats to the Demo- 
crats, then in another election under the 
same system x% of  the Republican votes 
would  yield  the  same  y%  Republican 
allocation of  seats. This is the situation 
that  Grofman  (1983)  calls  "completely 
unbiased." 
Stated more formally, if  V = x *  S = 
y,  then VR  =  x =+ SR = y,  for all x and y. 
This completely unbiased system requires 
only one point at which the percentage of 
votes equals the percentage of  seats: when 
each party receives 50% of  the votes, the 
seats must  be  divided  equally  between 
them. The partisan fairness expressed by 
this symmetry does not restrict x to equal 
y at any but this point. When it is true 
that x = y, for all x and y, we have the 
situation  of  unbiased  proportional 
representation. However, there are many 
other  interesting  types  of  unbiased Representation and Partisan Bias 
representation systems, and our model ex- 
plicitly  incorporates  the  full  range  of 
these.3 
Bias,  formalized  as  partisan  asym- 
metry, makes it possible for one party to 
receive 50% of  the votes but not neces- 
sarily 50% of  the seats. This situation is 
modeled similarly: If  V = x  *  S = y, 
then VR = x  SR = Z,  where y is not 
necessarily  equal to z.  However,  in the 
United States, even a biased system would 
not allocate any seats to a party without 
any votes. This means that both biased 
and  unbiased  systems  are  restricted  to 
pass through the (O%, 0%)  and (loo%, 
100%) points on the votes-to-seats curve; 
it is near the middle range of  votes and 
seats that the potential for bias is greatest. 
Our model  of  representation and bias 
will now be developed and explained in 
more  detail.  We  introduce  the  mathe- 
matical form and explain the substantive 
significance of  the bias and representation 
parameters of  each. Those  preferring  a 
nonmathematical exposition are referred 
to Figures 1-3. 
Modeling Representation 
There are a number of  plausible func- 
tional forms that could be used to model 
the full range of representation while still 
restricting  the  system  to  be  unbiased. 
Most of  these forms lead to nearly iden- 
tical  conclusions,  if  not  to  the  same 
models.  We  believe  our  model  best 
matches the definitions above and has the 
additional advantage of  being a general- 
ized form of  the best-known model of  the 
votes-seats relationship, the "cube law" of 
electoral politics. Our generalization also 
extracts the hidden features of  this formal 
"law,"  known  at  least  since  1909  (see 
Kendall and Stuart 1950), and expresses 
them  in  a more interpretable form. We 
show how this form can realistically and 
flexibly model concepts and relationships 
of  fundamental importance to democratic 
theorists,  political  scientists,  and  the 
courts. 
Equation 1, with p set equal to 3, is the 
classic cube law: 
Some time after its inception, investiga- 
tion with actual election results indicated 
that values for p other than 3 were better 
descriptions of  many  electoral systems 
(see Taagepera 1973; Tufte 1973; and the 
citations in Grofman 1983, 317). While 
this mathematical relationship is straight- 
forward,  it  is  difficult to  interpret in a 
theoretically  meaningful  way  wikhout 
either knowledge of  analytical geometry 
or specific applications. 
As  an  alternative,  consider  the  alge- 
braic characterization that follows. First, 
by taking natural logs, we rewrite Equa- 
tion 1  as 
Tufte  (1973,  545),  making  unrealistic 
assumptions about  the disturbance term 
(see Linehan and Schrodt 1978), estimated 
p  by  running  a  linear  regression  of 
In[S/(l  -S)]  on ln[V/(l  -V)]  and includ- 
ing a constant term in the equati~n.~  With 
some additional algebraic manipulation, 
Equation 2 can be expressed as a modifi- 
cation  of  the  dichotomous logit  model 
(see King 1986a). Thus, from the perspec- 
tive  of  models common in political sci- 
ence, Equation 3 should be more directly 
interpretable: 
There  are  two  differences  between 
Equation 3 and the logit model commonly 
used  to analyze dichotomous dependent 
variables: In(V/l -  V) is a log-odds func- 
tion of  V;  and there is no constant term. American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
Figure I. Forms of  Unbiased Representation (Based on Equation 3) 
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However, the inverse of  the term in braces 
still ranges between 0  and 1, and, when 
multiplied by D, the entire right-hand side 
is restricted to vary between 0  and D, the 
number  of  districts.  Since  a  log-odds 
transformation is the inverse of  a logit, we 
call  Equation  3  the  bilogit  functional 
form.  Thus,  we  have  in  Equation 3 a 
model that generates the forms of  repre- 
sentation depicted in Figure 1.5 
Figure  1 demonstrates  the  range  of 
functional forms  that  can  emerge from 
Equation 3 and depend on the value of 
p  (rho),  the representation parameter. We 
discuss winner-take-all representation (p 
= a),  majoritarian representation (1 <  p 
< a),  and proportional  representation 
(  p = 1).  Equation 3 can also be used to 
model  antimajoritarian  or  unresponsive 
representation (0  < p < I),  not discussed 
here. 
When  D  = 1.  the translation of  votes 
into seats is bys  proportional  representa- 
tion.  As the figure indicates,  some pro- 
portion  of  votes will  yield  exactly that 
proportion  of  seats for  the  Democratic 
party.  Exact  proportional representation 
is  unlikely  in  actual U.S.  district-based 
elections, if  only because there are fewer 
seats than votes:  it would require a pro- 
portional increase in seats (1/ T,  to be pre- 
cise) for even one additional vote; this is 
imp.ossible,  unless there were one seat for 
each  voter.  Other more realistic condi- Representation and Partisan Bias 
tions, such as incumbency and party com- 
petition, can also lead to results that are 
not proportional. 
Majoritarian representation is the situa- 
tion where 1  < p < a.  The further p is 
from 1, the further the electoral system is 
from proportional representation. A com- 
mon example of  this is the cube law (p = 
3), portrayed as the curve in Figure 1  in 
the shape of  an escalator. This relation- 
ship between seats and votes helps majori- 
ties  to form. When  a party approaches 
50% of  the votes, each additional incre- 
ment of  voters increases the proportion of 
seats by a larger amount, as evidenced by 
the steep slope at V = 3;  thus, parties 
are encouraged in their search for majori- 
ties. There is also an incentive for more 
partisan competition, since the marginal 
benefit, in terms of  seats, of  an additional 
increment of  votes is greatest as both par- 
ties approach 50% of  the votes. But one 
aspect of  this relationship has been over- 
looked: although this form of  representa- 
tion  favors  majority  and  near-majority 
parties,  there is a sense in which it pro- 
tects minorities. This can be seen by look- 
ing near the top and bottom of  the graph, 
where the slope of  the line becomes pro- 
gressively flatter. After a party gets 50% 
of  the vote (and a majority of  seats), each 
additional  increment  of  votes  yields  a 
smaller incremental proportion  of  seats. 
The  increase  in  the  proportion  of 
majority-party  voters  it  would  take  to 
eliminate  the  last  percentage  point  of 
minority seats (i.e., from 99% to 100% 
for the majority party) is far greater than 
the  increase in voters it would  take  to 
reduce  minority  representation by  one 
percentage point near the middle of  the 
curve (say,  from  55% to 56%  for  the 
majority party). This majoritarian elec- 
toral system thus encourages majorities to 
form but  simultaneously makes it more 
difficult for minority representation to be 
eliminated.  Although  only  one  type  of 
majoritarian representation is pictured in 
Figure 1, there are an infinite number of 
possibilities-from  just  beyond  propor- 
tional  representation  (p > 1) to  just 
before winner-take-all (r < a). 
A  third  situation  is  winner-take-all, 
which occurs when  p  = oo. This is also 
portrayed in Figure 1. In this case, 50% 
plus one vote translates into 100% of  the 
seats.  Although this  situation exists for 
each congressional district, for example, it 
does not usually apply to aggregates of 
them.6 
Although  proportional  representation 
is most often proffered as the standard of 
fairness, we  see  no  a  priori  reason  to 
believe that one form of  representation is 
inherently more fair than the others, pro- 
vided  that  there  is  partisan  symmetry. 
Convincing arguments can  be  made  in 
favor of  each of  these types of  democratic 
representation.  At  first  glance  propor- 
tional representation seems fair, since the 
translation  process  reflects  underlying 
voter preferences most directly. But repre- 
sentation systems need not only reflect to 
be fair and meaningful (King and Rags- 
dale 1987; Pitkin 1967). Winner-take-all 
systems, for example, have some elements 
of  reflection but also recognize that only 
one party can, and assume that only one 
party should, govern. These electoral sys- 
tems thus emphasize ability to govern and 
reflection  in  the  method  of  translating 
citizen  votes  into  legislative  seats.  In 
general, there is a trade-off between these 
two  criteria,  but  since  winner-take-all 
systems do not favor one political party 
over the other, there is no real reason to 
consider it unfair. In fact, one can argue 
that  majoritarian  representation, falling 
between proportional and winner-take-all 
representation,  best  describes  many 
popular  notions  of  U.S. democracy: 
majorities  are  encouraged,  but  small 
minorities are protected and thus repre- 
sented. An "optimal" value of  p is there- 
fore a matter for political or judicial deci- 
sion. Thus, there appears to be no a priori 
or axiomatic basis on which to choose one 
system over another.' American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
Modeling Bias 
Although there are many types of  "fair" 
democratic  systems  of  representation, 
partisan  bias  is  usually  condemned. 
Unfortunately, although partisan bias is 
often  discussed, it  is seldom estimated. 
Indeed, it is not even included as part of 
the cube law. In order to incorporate the 
possibility  of  bias  into  this  model,  we 
must choose a form that still restricts the 
votes-seats curve to pass through the (0,O) 
and (1,l) points; this means that a party 
with no votes will receive no seats. At the 
same time, this model must still allow for 
the full range of  forms of  representation 
already explicated. 
Our solution is to augment Equation 1 
(reinterpreted as Equation 3) with a bias 
parameter; this allows the joint estimation 
of  both partisan bias and democratic rep- 
resentation. Letting 0 (beta) be  the bias 
parameter, the new generalized cube law 
can be written as8 
This form  allows the  curves drawn  in 
Figure  1, from Equation 3, to be asp- 
metric, our definition of  partisan bias.9 
Almost  every  empirical  study  of  the 
cube law has implicitly assumed that 0 = 
1, the situation of  no bias. When there is 
in  fact  no  bias,  the  0  = 1 constraint 
causes no problem. However, when there 
is bias toward one of  the political parties, 
the constraint will  result  in  statistically 
inconsistent  estimates.  The  model  in 
Equation 4 allows for bias  without  the 
possibility  of  statistical  inconsistency. 
Tufte  (1973) was  probably  the  first  to 
recognize  that  bias  and  representation 
could be modeled in one equation, and his 
was a linear approximation to Equation 4. 
We believe our nonlinear model is a more 
realistic version  than Tufte's  in that  we 
allow for every possible degree of  partisan 
bias  and  every possible form  of  demo- 
cratic  representation.  Unlike  the  linear 
model, even systems with widely varying 
and quite extreme values of  S and V can 
be incorporated in this model. 
Equation  4 can also be written in an 
algebraically equivalent, but  more sub- 
stantively interpretable, bilogit form: 
s = D  1  + exp  -  In@)  1  [ 
We incorporate the bias parameter in 
this model because of  widespread concern 
about  the  fairness of  the  congressional 
reapportionment  process.  We  therefore 
provide a  more realistic model  of  both 
bias and representation, allowing for the 
exact form of  the bias to depend upon the 
specific type of  electoral representation. 
Consider now what happens when bias is 
added to the unbiased forms of  represen- 
tation pictured in Figure 1. 
Generically, bias refers to asymmetry 
in the seats-votes relationship for the two 
parties. The easiest type of  bias to under- 
stand is for winner-take-all systems (p  = 
oo). A bias in favor of  the Republicans is 
the case where  the discontinuity in  the 
curve (the vertical part of  the line in Fig. 
1, P = oo) is moved to the right: the pro- 
portion  of  the vote  that  the Democrats 
would have to win in order to take all the 
seats would be greater than half. Similar- 
ly, if  the discontinuity moved to the left, 
the bias would help the Democrats. Bias 
in winner-take-all systems is so apparent 
that  it  rarely  occurs in  U.S.  elections, 
except in the presence of  fraud or other 
abuses.lO  The  particular  forms  of  bias 
associated  with  the  other  two  types of 
representation are quite distinct and more 
complex. The empirical results presented 
below  indicate  that  bias  coexists  with 
many forms of  representation in a number 
of  U.S. states. 
Table 1  summarizes the possible ranges Representation and Partisan Bias 
of  the bias parameter and their respective 
interpretations. Since fl is log-symmetric 
(ranging from 0  to oo with 1  at the center), 
it will be convenient to express the coeffi- 
cient in terms of  its natural log, that is In@ 
(ranging from -  oo to  oo with 0  at the 
center). 
Figure 2 plots three types of  bias under 
a  proportional  representation system.ll 
Infl = 0  is obviously the case of  no bias: 
.5 Democratic votes yields .5 Democratic 
seats; .6  Democratic votes yields .6 Dem- 
ocratic seats. This is proportional repre- 
sentation because the proportion of  seats 
equals  the  proportion  of  votes;  it  is 
unbiased because these same figures also 
hold for the Republican party.  The 45" 
Table I. Bias Coefficient Values 
Coefficient Value  Direction of  Bias 
- 
lnfi >  0  o  P >  1  bias towards Democrats 
Infi = 0  o  p = 1  unbiased 
I@ <  0  *  0 <  1  bias toward Republicans 
line embodies this relationship;  a given 
percentage change in seats yields an equal 
percentage change in votes throughout. In 
evaluating the other two biased lines, it is 
useful to consider this unbiased plot as the 
baseline. 
For example, under proportional repre- 
sentation,  .5  Democratic  votes  should 
Figure 2.  Bias and Proportional Representation (Based on Equation 5) 
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yield .5 Democratic seats (because this is 
where the vertical line meets the unbiased 
line), but the line marked In0 = -  1  only 
allocates .27 Democratic seats and the line 
marked In@ = 1  allocates .73. A similar 
situation exists at all other points on this 
graph. At  .6 Democratic votes, the fair 
outcome is .6 Democratic seats, but the 
upper line, In0 = 1, is biased toward the 
Democrats, yielding .8 of  the Democratic 
seats. The lower line, In0 = -1,  is biased 
toward the Republicans, yielding only .36 
Democratic seats. The asymmetry defines 
our theoretical notion of  bias. 
Note that for each point on the horizon- 
tal axis, there is a different absolute bias 
for different parts of  any biased line. For 
lnp = 1, the absolute bias is 1.5 -  .73 1  = 
.23 at .5 of  the Democratic votes, but it is 
only 1.6 -  .81  = .20 at .6 votes Demo- 
cratic. In our model, the maximum abso- 
lute bias  occurs at or near  the .5 mark 
because  the  curves  converge  as  they 
approach 0 or 1. This provides some justi- 
fication  for  formal  statistical  models 
(Quandt 1974) and more intuitive analy- 
ses (Tufte 1973) based on bias measured 
only at .5. However, since there are many 
electoral  systems  where  the  percentage 
Democratic  is  rarely  near  50%, it  also 
suggests  that  we  should look  past  this 
point to incorporate the full range of  bias. 
For  proportional representation systems, 
a measure based on the Gini index of  the 
area  between  the  biased  and  unbiased 
curves is possible, but this does not gen- 
eralize as easily to the majoritarian repre- 
sentation or winner-take-all cases. Grof- 
man's (1975, 1983) "normalized measure" 
of  bias could be utilized here, but for pres- 
ent  purposes  the  most  natural  way  to 
measure the range of  bias existing in the 
system is to use 0 or, equivalently, lnp. 
Figure 3 expresses bias for majoritarian 
representation systems of  the specific type 
p = 3. The line in the middle, marked lnp 
= 0,  is  the  unbiased  line  included for 
reference. At .6 votes Democratic, the fair 
proportion  of  Democratic  seats  is  .77. 
This is fair under the  P = 3 majoritarian 
system, but  not necessarily under other 
representational schemes. For the lnp = 
-1  line,  there  is  a  bias  favoring  the 
Republicans,  so that  the same  .6 votes 
Democratic yields only a .55 proportion 
of Democratic seats. The lnp = 1  line, 
biased toward the Democrats, yields .9 of 
the Democratic seats. For this figure, the 
absolute bias  is  also  different  for  each 
point on the horizontal axis. For the line 
marked In0 = 1, the absolute bias at .5 
votes Democratic is 1.5 -  .731 = .23, but 
the absolute bias at .6  is only 1.77 -  .901 
= .13.12 
Deterministic Laws 
and Probabilistic Realities 
Some of  the most significant contribu- 
tions to the literature on seats-votes rela- 
tionships imply  that  the  cube  law,  or 
some  relevant  variant,  is  deterministic. 
Whether this relationship is deterministic 
or probabilistic is an empirical issue, and 
it has important consequences for theo- 
retical understanding and data analyses. 
We believe it is difficult to find even one 
meaningful example of  a deterministic law 
anywhere in the social sciences.13  There is 
also strong evidence that a deterministic 
relationship between seats and votes does 
not exist:  While the cube law is stated 
deterministically,  even  a  cursory exam- 
ination of  election statistics shows that it 
does not hold  perfectly"  (Schrodt 1981, 
33). Michels's (1911) "Iron Law of  Oligar- 
chy" and many others have also failed the 
test.  In  making  a  general  point  (coin- 
cidentally using the cube law as an exam- 
ple),  Achen  (1982,  15)  writes,  "Any 
attempt at specifying exact causal func- 
tions  must  necessarily  result  in  over- 
simplified explanations." 
The Appendix  develops a  number  of 
original, but somewhat technical, points: 
we  justify  a  binomial  disturbance term 
and  add  it  to  Equation  5,  propose  a Representation and Partisan Bias 
Figure 3.  Bias and Majoritarian Representation (Based on Equation 5;  P = 3) 
.5  .6 
Proportion  Democratic Votes 
method of  estimation, and provide some 
empirical  estimates.  The  sections  that 
follow use the results from the Appendix. 
Data and Measures 
To demonstrate the empirical utility of 
this model, it is applied to data on U.S. 
congressional  elections,  1950-84.14 For 
most analyses of  the U.S.  Congress, the 
entire nation has been used. But there are 
significant findings that demonstrate sub- 
stantial variation across states (e.g., Scar- 
row 1983;  Tufte 1973).  We will therefore 
conduct separate analyses for each state, 
using the 18 elections between 1950 and 
1984. Alaska and Hawaii were excluded 
because they were not states during the 
entire period.  Small changes in the elec- 
tions  included  in  the  analysis did  not 
materially alter the results because of  the 
generally slow changes in state electoral 
systems. 
The  implied  assumption  in  this  ap 
proach is that  @ and p vary more across 
states than over time within any one state. 
We believe that this is justifiable on two 
grounds. First,  the whole process of  re- 
apportionment is conducted separately by 
each state legislature. Aside from signifi- 
cant variation  in the decisions by  state 
legislatures, there are also large discrepan- 
cies in  political geography and political 
culture  among  the  states.  Surely,  the American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
variation  over time would be less than 
these cross-state differences. Second, we 
report large variations in both the degree 
of  bias  and  the  type  of  representation 
across states (see Figs.  4 and 5). At  the 
same time, empirical tests indicated sub- 
stantial stability within states over time.15 
If  /3  and  p'do vary more than expected 
over time for a particular state, then our 
estimates are average values for that state. 
These data were coded from, and cross- 
checked against, the Statistical Abstract 
of the  U.S. (annual volumes),  Congres- 
sional Quarterly's  (1975) Guide  to U.S. 
Elections, Cox's (1972) State and National 
Voting,  1910-1970,  and  Scammon  and 
McGillivrayfs  America  Votes  (annual 
volumes). As Niemi and Fett (1986) point 
out, the data collection is not as straight- 
forward as it might seem. For  example, 
we  delete  the  very  few  representatives 
who had won seats under the independ- 
ent-party label and subtracted the votes 
received  by  their  Democratic  and 
Republican opponents from the statewide 
total. We ignore resignations,deaths, and 
special elections. The member  receiving 
the most votes in the general election was 
presumed to be elected. At-large districts, 
used by a few states immediately follow- 
ing reapportionment, are excluded unless 
there  is  only  one  district  in  the  state. 
Several  states  have  laws  that  do  not 
require votes to be tabulated in  uncon- 
tested races. For these states, we included 
only those districts and votes that were 
contested and reported. All other districts 
and votes are included. 
Some  have  argued  that  the  form  of 
democratic representation is a function of 
the number  of  districts and  voters,  the 
geographical distribution, party competi- 
tion, and the number of  incumbents. Our 
approach follows two steps. We first esti- 
mate the bias and representation parame- 
ters for each state using  the number of 
votes and seats for each party and election 
from 1950 to 1984. Once these parameters 
have been estimated, we show how differ- 
ences in these estimates across states can 
be explained by measures of  state political 
characteristics.  This two-stage  approach 
is as good as a simultaneous estimation 
because p, p ,  and many of  these exoge- 
nous state characteristics  change consider- 
ably more across states than over time.lb 
Estimating Representation and 
Bias in U.S. House Elections 
Using Equation 5 as the general model, 
the estimation procedure described in the 
Appendix,  and  the  data  introduced 
below,  bias  and  representation  coeffi- 
cients were estimated for each state. We 
present the results in Table A-1. For easier 
interpretation, Figure 4 presents a histo- 
gram of  the representation coefficients.17 
Note that the distribution of  these coeffi- 
cients are trimodal, with modes at or near 
1, 6, and 10. Most of  the states are quite 
near to proportional representation, but 
significant numbers are strongly majori- 
tarian,  and  several  are  approximately 
winner-take-all.  Note  that  although  p 
ranges  up  to  infinity,  p  coefficients 
greater than 8 or 9 are essentially winner- 
take-all. 
This finding demonstrates the utility of 
the model in three ways. First,  it shows 
the large variance in  the type of  repre- 
sentation across states. Second, it demon- 
strates that the plurality of  states are just 
above proportional representation (p = 
1).  Although a  number of  studies have 
shown that p is not equal to 3, the cube- 
law value, most find that p falls between 2 
and 4, with an average of  about 3. Finally, 
the results indicate that previous estima- 
tion  procedures may  have  been  statis- 
tically inconsistent due to the exclusion of 
a  bias parameter.  The extent  of  incon- 
sistency in previous research is also quite 
substantial: although deriving an analyt- 
ical  expression  for  the  inconsistency 
appears intractable, it is possible to get a 
feel  for  the  extent  of  the  problem.  To Representation and Partisan Bias 
Figure 4.  Representation in U.S. States 
Representation,  ^p 
accomplish this, the state bilogit estima- 
tions were also run while constraining 0 
= 1  (i.e., In0 = OJ-exactly  as if  the bias 
parameter had not been included. In these 
constrained estimations, p was too large 
about 1.5 times more often than it was too 
small.  It  thus  appears  that  previous 
research has overestimated the degree to 
which U.S.  democracy tended away from 
proportional  representation and  toward 
majoritarian  representation.  Although 
these are the tendencies, in any particular 
example it is unclear whether the incon- 
sistency will cause the estimate of  p to be 
too large or too small; the proper way to 
provide a consistent estimate of  p is to use 
the joint  model  and  estimation method 
proposed here.18 
There is also substantial variation in the 
degree and direction of  bias in U.S.  con- 
gressional elections across states. Figure 5 
presents a histogram of  the estimated fl 
coefficients. Note that the mean is almost 
exactly 0,  and there is an approximately 
symmetric  normal  distribution  around 
this point. This implies that the average of 
the states is  not  too biased  toward one 
party more than the other. However, not 
all points fall on or about In@ = 0, sug- 
gesting that  at least  some bias exists in 
individual states. In  fact, even allowing 
for deviations from unbiasedness due to 
sampling  variation  and  measurement 
error,  the  point  estimates indicate  that 
some states have quite large biases  (see 
Fig. 5).  There are two well-defined groups ~rnerica~~olitical  Science Review  Vol. 81 
Figure 5.  Bias in U.S.  States 
A 
Bias,  In(B1 
of  outliers at the ends of  Figure 5. Kansas, 
Michigan,  and Ohio have  a  substantial 
Republican  bias,  whereas  Texas,  Cali- 
fornia,  and  Florida  have  a  substantial 
Democratic bias.19 
The effect of  bias on proportional and 
majoritarian  representation  systems  is 
seen  in  the  examples  of  Indiana  and 
Texas, graphed in Figures 6 and 7, respec- 
tively. Indiana is a generally Republican, 
but still competitive, two-party state. our 
results indicate a very slight Republican 
bias (the unbiased baseline is almost indis- 
tinguishable from our empirical findings) 
and  a  steep,  majoritarian,  seats-votes 
relationship  (the  unbiased  baseline  is 
a  steep  curve  with  two  sharp  bends). 
Indiana and other strong party states tend 
to demonstrate the slight bias and steeper 
slope portrayed in this figure. 
Representation in Texas is quite near to 
proportional.  The  no-bias  baseline  in 
Texas is the nearly straight-line propor- 
tional relationship (see Fig.  7). However, 
this baseline deviates substantially from 
Texas  electoral  politics;  the  dominant 
Democratic  tradition  has  created  quite 
severe biases toward the Democrats, per- 
mitting  them  to win  a  majority .of  the 
seats with less than 30% of  the votes. This 
is an extreme example of  the biases that 
do exist in U.S. politics. Representation and Partisan Bias 
A 
Figure 6.  Bias and Representation in Indiana ( @  = 5.70, In( P) = -.OS) 
Proportion  Democratic Votes 
Explaining Representation and 
Bias in the U.S. House 
In this section, we explore the differ- 
ences among states in the bias and repre- 
sentation coefficients generated previous- 
ly. This analysis helps to validate the esti- 
mates  produced  there.  Leaving  out  the 
states with too little data for estimation or 
with coefficients equal to infinity (indicat- 
ing  winner-take-all  representation), two 
series  (bias  and  representation) of  44 
observations each remain. The parameter 
estimates have different expected values 
(asyrnptoticaliy equal to the population 
parameters) across states. The variation 
around these expected values is likely to 
be different for each coefficient, resulting 
in  heteroscedastic  disturbances.  Fortu- 
nately, we can estimate these variances by 
the approximate squared standard error 
resulting  from  the  firststage  analysis. 
Furthermore, since the first-stage analysis 
was estimated with maximum likelihood, 
these  coefficients will  be  normally  dis- 
tributed. 
Taking all  these factors into account, 
we use a weighted least-squares analysis, 
regressing the estimates of  representation 
and bias on separate sets of  explanatory 
variables.20 Consider representation first. 
There  are  two  main  explanations  for 
variation in the representation parameter. 
The best  justified  is  Taagepera's  (1973) 
index,  In(T)/ln(D), where  T is Ihe total 
number of  voters and D is the number of 
districts. To understand the logic behind 
this  index,  it  is  useful  to  focus on  the American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
Figure 7.  Bias and Representation in Texas (0 = 1.05,  In($) = 1.12) 
Proportion  Democratic Votes 
extreme cases. When there is no bias and 
one district for each voter (i.e., T = D), 
x% of  the votes for one party will auto- 
matically yield  X%  of  the seats for that 
party.  This  proportional  representation 
result  is captured by Taagepera's index, 
since ln(T)/ln(D),  where T = D, is equal 
to 1. The winner-take-all extreme is also 
captured by this index: When there is only 
one district for all the voters, as in a presi- 
dential election, we  have ln(T)/ln(l) = 
ln(T)/O = a.  Thus, the extreme values of 
this index are theoretically appropriate. 
Between  these  two  extremes,  the  index 
predicts  a  gradual  and  continuous  in- 
crease in the representation parameter- 
from proportional (,p = 1)  to majoritarian 
(1  < p  < co)  to winner-take-all (  p = 00) 
forms of  representation-as  the number 
of  districts increases relative to the num- 
ber of  voters. The precise rate at which p 
increases  is  defined  by  the form of  his 
index, In(T)/ln(D). Other forms that also 
meet the boundary conditions are possi- 
ble, but Taagepera's (1973) seems plausi- 
ble.  In the weighted-least-squares regres- 
sion analysis  performed here, this hypoth- 
esis would be confirmed if  the regression 
coefficient on this index were 1.0 and the 
coefficients on the other variables in the 
equation were 0. 
Party competition has been  suggested 
as an examination for the form of  repre- 
sentation. In strongly competitive party 
systems, where the percentage voting for 
each party in each election district is near 
50%; a  small increase in  votes for one 
party across districts will likely result in a Representation and Partisan Bias 
Table 2.  Explaining Representation 
Independent Variable  Estimated Coefficient  Standard Error  t-Statistic 
Constant  -1.17  .67  - 
Taagepera's index  .32  .07  4.62 
Party competition  2.17  .70  3.09 
Note: Number of  observations (states) = 44: standard error of  the weighted-least-squares regression = .82; 
mean of  the dependent variable'(p") = 1.54; 
large  increase  in  seats for  that  party. 
Party competition also encompasses the 
effect of  the power of incumbency and un- 
contested  seats.  From  the  widely  used 
Ranney  index  of  state  party  strength 
(Ranney 1976), we construct a measure of 
party competition that ranges from 0  (no 
competition) to 1  (pure competiti~n).~~ 
Table 2  presents  the  weighted  least- 
squares regression of  our estimated rep- 
resentation  parameters  on  Taagepera's 
index  and party  competition.  The esti- 
mates for the effect of  both variables are 
relatively  precise  and,  at  conventional 
levels,  significantly  different  from  0. 
Taagepera's index has an effect about one- 
third of  what his theory would predict, 
but it has the correct sign, and helps to 
explain interstate variation in the form of 
representation.  This finding has several 
interpretations:  a  different  form  of  the 
index might account somewhat better for 
the range of  representation types between 
proportional and winner-take-all, or there 
may be a tendency for U.S.  states to be 
more  proportional  than  would  be  ex- 
pected solely on the basis of  the relative 
sizes of  their voter populations and num- 
bers of  legislative districts. Both the value 
of, and the need for further research on, 
Taagepera's index are emphasized by this 
result. 
The  effect  of  party  competition  is 
shown to be  relatively strong: if  a state 
were to move from the lowest to the high- 
est level of  partisan competition, the rep- 
resentation parameter would move more 
than two points toward the winner-take- 
all  extreme  (see  Table 2).  This is well 
within  the  bounds  of  the  original 
hypothesis. 
The propensity of  a state to be biased 
toward the Republicans or Democrats has 
generally been explained by relative party 
strength.  Parties  may  be  in  decline  in 
some ways, but the desire to gerrymander 
remains as strong as ever.12 We  would 
therefore expect all parties in all states to 
attempt  to  gerrymander,  but  only  the 
states with dominant party systems would 
be successful. 
As a measure of  party strength, we use 
the Ranney index, ranging, as usual, from 
0  (Republican)  to 1  (Democratic).  We also 
use a measure of  state ideological orienta- 
tion ranging from -1  (liberal) to 1  (con- 
servative), estimated from state level CBS 
News-New  York Times polls by Wright, 
Erikson, and McIver (1985). 
The  weighted-least-squares-regression 
results of  estimated bias  on state party 
strength and state ideological orientation 
are reported in Table 3.  Both coefficients 
are  in  the  hypothesized  directions, 
although the ideology coefficient does not 
meet  conventional  significance  levels. 
Our  results  indicate  that  the  strongest 
Democratic state has  a  bias  coefficient 
about .9 points higher (in the direction of 
Democratic  bias)  than  the  strongest 
Republican state,  and that  ideologically 
liberal states tend to be somewhat more 
biased toward the Democrats. 
The plausibility of  these second-stage 
results  lends  criterion  validity  to  our 
original  model.  Variations in  our  esti- 
mates of  bias and representation in  the 
U.S.  states vary  relatively  closely with American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
Table 3.  Explaining Partisan Bias 
Independent Variable  Estimated Coefficient  Standard Error  t-Statistic 
Constant  -.44  .20  - 
Party strength  .90  .32  2.82 
Ideology  -.67  .59  -1.15 
Note: Number of  observations (states) = 44;  standard error of  the weighted-least-squares regression = .64; 
mean of  the dependent variable (P)  = -.05. 
these plausible criterion variables. Sensi- 
tivity analyses indicate that these findings 
are quire robust to marginally different 
 specification^.^^ 
Conclusion 
In this paper, the venerable cube law of 
electoral policies was reformulated, gen- 
eralized, and reinterpreted to provide a 
model for the relationship between votes 
and seats in representative democracies. 
Whereas  Taagepera  (1986)  generalized 
this  law  to  proportional-representation 
elections, we generalize it to include both 
the form of  democratic representation and 
the  extent  of  partisan  bias.  Previous 
analyses tended to confuse  the form of 
representation with the degree of  partisan 
bias and have unintentionally constrained 
the  partisan-bias  parameter,  in  effect 
assuming no bias. 
One  consequence of  this  is  that  un- 
biasedness has mistakenly been associated 
with proportional representation. We find 
that all representation types captured by a 
single parameter in  our model can treat 
the parties symmetrically using our defini- 
tion of  unbiasedness. Recent court rulings 
have upheld this view." 
Additionally,  by  constraining  the  fl 
parameter,  past  research  has  yielded 
statistically inconsistent estimates of  the 
representation  parameter,  p ,  ranging 
between  2  and  4  for  most  electoral 
systems.  In  contrast,  we  find  that  the 
plurality of  states were  much  closer  to 
proportional  representation  than  had 
been previously believed. Nevertheless, it 
is not true that all previous estimations of 
representation  can  simply  be  slightly 
adjusted toward 1.0. Although the empir- 
ical tendency is in this direction, the direc- 
tion and size of  the inconsistency is un- 
known for any particular example. Thus, 
some  previous  analyses  may  be  over- 
estimates  and  some  may  be  under- 
estimates. Statistical consistency requires 
that partisan bias be incorporated as an 
additional parameter. After all, if  a party 
receives, for example,  55% of  the votes 
and 75% of  the seats, this may represent a 
severe partisan bias or a fair system with 
majoritarian  representation.  The  only 
way to distinguish between the two situa- 
tions is to have joint estimates of  both fl 
and p. 
The  remarkably flexible bilogit  func- 
tional  form  helped  to  highlight  these 
problems with past research in the context 
of  a  theoretically  meaningful  solution. 
The model developed herein also demon- 
strates that different forms of  representa- 
tion are associated with different forms of 
bias, and that partisan bias can occur in 
widely  varying degrees.  This paper has 
also contributed to the statistical estima- 
tion  of  this inherently  nondeterministic 
relationship  between  seats  and  votes. 
Applying a discrete probability distribu- 
tion to the discrete variable, s, the number 
of  Democratic  seats,  is  a  considerably 
more statistically efficient procedure than 
had previously been used. In an applica- 
tion to congressional elections, we  dem- 
onstrate that there exists a wide variety of 
representation  systems  and  degrees  of Representation andPartisan Bias 
partisan  bias.  These  variations  have 
important implications for national poli- 
tics and policy (Browning 1986). 
Finally, a second stage of  the analysis 
provided some validity to the estimates 
from  the first stage and some evidence 
that there are systematic explanations for 
the direction and size of  the bias and rep- 
resentation parameters. The level of  state 
party competition and Taagepera's index 
of  state  and  electorate  size  helped  to 
explain  differences in  the representation 
parameter  estimates  across  states.  The 
Ranney  index  of  party  strength and  a 
measure  of  the  state  electorate's  ideo- 
logical  orientations indicated when and 
where bias was more likely to occur. 
Beyond  these  contributions,  these 
results also have important implications 
for the recent court cases on reapportion- 
ment. First, the courts must explicitly dis- 
tinguish between bias and representation 
type.  The discussion of  using seats and 
votes to create indicators of  political dis- 
crimination  in  the  federal-district-court 
decision  in  Bandemer  v. Davis  (603  F. 
Supp. 1479 [S.D. Ind. 19841) reveals con- 
fusion on that court's part  on this issue 
(see Browning and King  n.d.).  While it 
may be desirable for the courts to decide 
on an acceptable range for the type of  rep- 
resentation  in  U.S.  states, partisan bias 
is  a  separate  issue.  The  courts  would 
obviously prefer a system with no bias, 
but this too may not be possible. In such 
a  case,  the  courts  might  establish  an 
"acceptable"  level  of  bias.  Using  this 
method numerous elections over at least a 
decade are necessary to make a confident 
determination about  the  degree  of  bias 
and  type  of  representation. Perhaps in 
those  states with  a history  of  bias,  the 
courts might  more  closely  monitor  the 
reapportionment process,  or might even 
direct  a  court-ordered  reapportionment 
plan.  Regardless,  this  analysis can pro- 
vide an understanding of  the type of  dem- 
ocratic representation and the existence of 
partisan  bias  over  a  historical series of 
elections for a particular state. 
Appendix 
We show how our emphasis on prob- 
abilistic  relationships transforms  Equa- 
tion 5. We also resolve a problem existing 
in the political methodology literature so 
that p and p may be estimated efficiently 
and consistently. Estimates for each of  the 
states appear in Table A-1. 
Several  authors  have  recently  at- 
tempted to convert the deterministic cube 
law in Equation 1  (with p = 3) to a statis- 
tical relationship. The main issue here is 
how  to  incorporate a disturbance term 
(Linehan  and  Schrodt  1978)."  Schrodt 
(1981) provides the most comprehensive 
analysis of  possibilities but is ultimately 
unable to select any particular method: 
"In the absence of  a theoretical justifica- 
tion for a specific error structure in  the 
cube law, there is no a priori reason for 
choosing one . . .  model over the others" 
(Schrodt 1981, 35-36).2b 
For a solution to this disturbance-term 
problem, we take a different approach. In 
reformulating  the generalized  cube law, 
we find that it is more politically interest- 
ing and more natural to model seats (s) 
than the odds of  seats S/(1 -  S). The dis- 
turbance term should therefore be formu- 
lated in terms of  the more fundamental 
and interpretable variable, s.  Thus, we 
can rewrite Equation 5 to include an addi- 
tive disturbance term: 
E(s) = D 1 1 + exp r -  In@ 
The  expected  value  operator,  E(.), 
means  that  the  functional form  on  the 
right hand side of  Equation A-1 (a bilogit 
function of  votes) will  correctly predict 
the number of  seats, sf on average over American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
the long run. We assume in Equation A-2 
that E(ei) = 0. This means that, over the 
long run, the average error is zero. 
We now only need  to choose a prob- 
ability distribution for s  (or, equivalently, 
for e). Recall that s is the number of  seats 
allocated to the Democratic party.  It  is 
therefore a  nonnegative integer  ranging 
from 0  to D, the number of  legislative dis- 
tricts. To incorporate as much informa- 
tion into the distribution as possible,  we 
limit the range of  possibilities to discrete 
probability distributions. The distribution 
should have the mean as a parameter but 
should  not  necessarily  be  symmetric, 
since the bounds at 0  and D make sym- 
metry either impossible or implausible for 
means not equal to D/2.  Instead, a for- 
mulation more faithful to the concept of 
partisan  symmetry is required:  the  dis- 
tributions with parameters (D/2) + A and 
(D/2) -  A should be mirror images of  one 
another." 
The binomial distribution meets each of 
these requirements and is relatively easy 
to work with.  One possible  problem  is 
that district outcomes within a state may 
not be independent, as is assumed by the 
binomial  distribution.  Experiments with 
alternative formulations  that  allow  de- 
pendence among districts were performed 
and were found to add little to the analy- 
ses below. This result is consistent with 
recent  research  indicating  that  congres- 
sional  elections are local,  not national, 
events, fought primarily within individual 
election  districts  (Hinckley  1981). The 
likelihood  equation  that  emerges  from 
this distribution and Equation 5 is also 
quite similar to what  would  result  if  a 
Poisson or a variety of  other distributions 
were  chosen  (see King  n.d.,  1987); in- 
deed, estimates from this model would be 
consistent even  if  the distribution were 
not binomial but were a member of  the 
family of  linear exponential distributions 
(Gourieroux,  Monfort,  and  Trognon 
1984). The  results  would  therefore  be 
quite  similar  if  our  assumption  were 
incorrect. 
Thus,  for  the analyses below,  s was 
assumed  to  be  distributed  binomially; 
that is, 
where 6 = E(s), from Equation A-1.  D, 
the number of  districts, is assumed to be 
known a priori. E is defined as e = s -  6. 
For  a maximum likelihood solution, the 
log-likelihood equation, reduced to suf- 
ficient statistics,  can be written by sub- 
stituting Equation A-1 into Equation A-3, 
taking  logs,  simplifying,  and  summing 
over all observations: 
+  (Di -  si)  ln[l -  [I +  exp ( -  li$ 
The  Berndt  et  al.  (1974) numerical- 
estimation  algorithm,  in  combination 
with  the positive definite secant update 
method, was used to maximize this likeli- 
hood  function  to  derive  the  estimates 
described in the next  section. Relatively 
quick convergence was achieved in nearly 
all cases.2d  The estimates of  p and 0,  along 
with standard errors for each, appear in 
Table A-1.  This table is further discussed 
and analyzed in the text. Representation and Partisan Bias 
Table A-I. Representation and Bias Coefficient Values 
Standard  Standard 
States  fi  Error  In( n^  )  Error 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming American Political Science Review  Vol.  81 
Notes 
We appreciate the comments on earlier drafts of 
this  work  by,  and  discussions with,  Christopher 
Achen,  Nathaniel  Beck,  Gerald  Benjamin,  Paul 
Brace,  Steven Brams,  William Browning,  Bernard 
Grofrnan, Seung-Hyun Kim, William McLauchlan, 
Elizabeth Rosenthal, and William Shaffer. Hsing-Pei 
Gary Kao and Seung-Hyun Kim  assisted with the 
data collection. 
1. The "swing ratio" is related to what we call 
representation. However, the swing ratio-the  slope 
of  an estimated linear relationship between seats and 
votes-is  too restrictive to model the full range of 
nonlinear representational forms. 
2. Because  most  nondemocratic  regimes  also 
have voting, the seats-votes relationship is impor- 
tant  there  as well.  However,  the  mechanism  for 
translation is obviously very different. 
3. In Davis v. Bandemer (p. 2809), the Supreme 
Court  recognized  that  previous  cases  "clearly 
foreclose any claim that  the Constitution requires 
proportional  representation or that  legislatures in 
reapportioning must draw district lines as near as 
possible to allocating seats to the contending parties 
in  proportion  to what  their anticipated statewide 
vote will be." 
4.  For most of  his analyses, Tdte  (1973) used a 
linear approximation to this form because  at the 
time the logistic form was less commonly used and 
because the lack of  extreme points in his data made 
the approximation relatively good. Since 1973, the 
logistic model has been considerably more popular; 
the figures in this paper will also aid in this inter- 
pretation. In addition, the data used in the bias see 
tion, as well as the data available from other elec- 
toral systems, have substantial numbers of  extreme 
data points. Finally, as the figures will show, a linear 
approximation is not reasonable for many interest- 
ing  and  empirically  common  forms  of  bias  and 
representation. 
5.  The bilogit form is formally undefined when 
p = m. As a result, it would be technically more 
appropriate to characterize the winner-take-all situa- 
tion as p -  0. 
6.  Theil  (1969, 521) describes a  real  electoral 
situation where the system was created to help the 
minority at the expense of  the majority. Although 
this  antimajoritarian  representation system is  un- 
likely to occur much in U.S.  politics, it can be repre- 
sented in the current scheme as p < 1. 
7.  In an interesting but wholly impractical pro- 
posal, Theil(1969, 524) suggests that citizens express 
a preference for p at the same time as they vote for 
candidates. Preferences for p would then be aggre- 
gated before translating votes into seats. Although it 
is not  reasonable to "require the teaching of  log- 
arithms at an early stage" (1969, 524), this proposal 
does suggest the importance of  the p coefficient in 
standing for the type of  representation in the elec- 
toral system. 
8. If  we used  VR and SR in place of  V and S, 
respectively, then the bias parameter would be OR = 
I/@. Thus,  j3  is  implicitly  defined  in  terms  of 
Democrats. 
9. In  systems where each  party  is guaranteed 
some minimum  number of  seats regardless of  the 
outcome of  the vote, it would be possible to include 
an additive parameter in Equation 4 to take this into 
account. However, for congressional elections, this 
is obviously not relevant. 
10. This type of  bias occurs, for example, in deci- 
sions of  legislatures to seat members following close- 
ly contested elections.  Since the majority party in 
the legislature can establish its own rules to count 
disputed ballots, the member seated may not be the 
candidate with  the  most  votes.  In  our data,  we 
assume that the candidate with the most votes wins 
the seat and ignore the bias that occurs if  the legis- 
lature sat the "loser." 
11. These values for j3  are empirically reasonable 
in the context of  the analysis presented below. 
12. Note that this demonstrates that a Gini index 
measure is inappropriate unless proportional repre- 
sentation  is  deemed  the  only  fair  representation 
system. If  some form of  majoritarian representation 
were considered acceptable, then comparing one of 
the biased curves in Figure 3 to be the fair propor- 
tionality  curve  in  Figure  2  will  be  misleading; 
indeed, by that standard, even the fair majoritarian 
curve would be considered biased. It might be useful 
to generalize the Gini index and derive a measure of 
bias based on the area between the unbiased (j3 = 0 
and p  unconstrained) and the actual bias (j3 and p 
unconstrained) curves,  thus  incorporating  all  the 
absolute biases. But this is not needed, since 11$  con- 
tains all of  this information. 
13. Indeed, many modem-day physicists do not 
believe that even the physical world is deterministic 
(see the discussion in Zellner 1984). 
14. Niemi and Fett (1986) review several possibili- 
ties and conclude that their "historical swing ratio" is 
better than their "biyearly form." The main reason is 
that many data points are better than two. Curious- 
ly, However, they conclude their article by favoring 
the  "hypothetical (single-year) swing ratio."  They 
give other reasons for preferring this method, but we 
do not conclude as they do that many data points 
are better than two,  but  that one datum is better 
than many. Our analysis will  therefore use  many 
data points collected over time. 
15. The data were  split into  two nine-election- 
year samples for each state. The two sets each of  j3 
and p coefficients were each then correlated. Since 
positive infinity is a possible value for p, a simple 
measure of  association was not possible. Omitting 
these values usually led to correlation coefficients of 
about  .45.  More  revealing  were scatterplots that 
indicated closer fits between the two time periods Representation and Partisan Bias 
than any single coefficient could demonstrate. We 
also split the data to test whether the "one man, one 
vote" Supreme Court decision had an effect onp and 
j3. As one would expect, we concluded that changes 
in state politics occur slowly. Incumbency, political 
parties, and geographical and constitutional factors 
prevent wholesale changes in the structure of  repre- 
sentation and bias. 
16. One might hypothesize that p is a linear func- 
tion  of  a vector of  explanatory variables, such as 
state size (XI)  and party competition (XI): p = al + 
alXl  + a2  + XI.  It might also be  reasonable to 
hypothesize that  j3  is  a  function  of  explanatory 
variables such as party strength (Z1) and state ideo- 
logical orientation (Z,): j3  = 70 + rlZl + ~IZI.  The 
right hand side of  these two equations could then be 
substituted into Equation 5 to derive reduced-form 
estimates-resulting  in a form analogous to inter- 
action effects in regression analysis. This procedure 
is  inapplicable here, however, because j3  and p are 
assumed to vary only across states./en  alternative 
procedure is used below to express p and B as sto- 
chastic functions of  these explanatory variables. 
17. As  is apparent from Equation 5, no estimates 
can be computed when a party received 0 votes for a 
year or when there is no variation in the number of 
seats across the years.  For  this reason, the coeffi- 
cients of  several of  the states were not calculated on 
the full 18 years. The estimates from the following 
states are therefore not as reliable, since they have 
one or more years omitted (noted in parentheses): 
Georgia  (1950,  1952,  1958),  Louisiana  (1950), 
Missouri (1954, 1956, 1958, 1962), South Carolina 
(1950,  1958,  1960),  and  Arkansas  (1950,  1954, 
1958). This and other causes of  imprecision in the 
estimates  are  indicated in  the  standard errors in 
Table A-1. 
18. It is likely that (1)  less biased states (i.e., with 
smaller absolute values of  In@)  and (2) states where 
bias and representation vary independently will be 
closer to consistency  than  others, but  there is no 
consistent way to know this or to estimate the bias 
parameter without the full joint estimation presented 
here. 
19. The negative signs indicate bias toward  the 
Republicans;  the  positive  coefficients  indicate 
Democratic bias. Most of  the states listed in Table 
A-1 have estimated p and j3 coefficients within range 
of  what one would expect. The exceptions are most- 
ly those with large standard errors. These substan- 
tive points are more directly analyzed in the U.S. 
House. 
20.  The residuals from the two regressions corre- 
lated at only -.I17  (t-value -- -.765).  A seemingly 
unrelated regression would therefore be of  no help 
here. 
21.  If  we let R stand for the raw Ranney index, 
the measure described as party competition in the 
text is calculated as 1 -  2 1R -  51.  This is the dis- 
tance from being in between the parties, normalized 
to a 0-1 scale. 
22.  For example, the architect of  the recent and 
controversial California redistricting plan, late Con- 
gressman Phillip Burton (D-San Francisco),  "did not 
deny that  the gerrymander was alive and well  in 
California. Burton publicly joked that his zigzagging 
district lines were 'our contribution to modem art' " 
(Lowell and Craigie 1985, 246). 
23.  In particular, no evidence of  regional effects 
could  be  found:  after  controlling  for  the  other 
variables  in  the  equations,  the  South  and  other 
regions were not more likely to be characterized by 
different levels of  bias or representation. There was 
also no interactive regional effect on the coefficients 
from the weighted-least-squares results. 
24.  The plurality  in  Davis  v. Bandemer  (n. 9) 
recognized that there was a range of  fair seats-votes 
relationships  that  are  not  proportional.  Justices 
White,  Brennan,  Marshall,  and  Blackmun's  com- 
ment that their opinion "is not a preference for pro- 
portionality per  se but  a preference for a level of 
parity between votes and representation sufficient to 
ensure that significant minority voices are heard and 
that majorities are not consigned to minority status 
is  hardly  an illegitimate  extrapolation  from  our 
general majoritarian ethic and the objective of  fair 
and adequate representation recognized in Reynolds 
v. Sims." 
25.  It is useful to express  relationships statistically 
even if  there is no explicit sampling procedure. One 
only  need  conceptualize  the  dependent  variable 
(Democratic seats,  in  this  case) as  a  function  of 
systematic (votes Democratic in the bilogit  form) 
and random factors. The random factors are repre- 
sented by  a  disturbance  term  with  some  known 
probability distribution. 
26.  Schrodt finds that  three of  the five models 
"have the undesirable property of  varying depend- 
ing on which party is in the numerator and denom- 
inator" (1981, 36). (Our model avoids this problem: 
p is invariant and only the sign of  In@  changes by 
using the Republican, instead of  Democratic, party 
for  V.) Of  the remaining two,  he  concludes after 
empirical analyses that one "appears to have little 
utility" (p. 41). The final model seems best, but it 
produces the largest standard errors in applications. 
It also assumes  that  the  disturbance  term  is log- 
normal, which may be appropriate at times, but "is 
not the sort of  probability distribution for an error 
term that one is likely to choose by default" (Linehan 
and Schrodt 1978). 
27.  Most probability distributions are eliminated 
by  these  axioms. The Poisson  distribution is  not 
bounded  from  above  (King n.d.),  and  the  tmn- 
cated Poisson distribution does not meet the invari- 
ant requirement (Johnson and Kotz 1969).  The beta- 
binomial and contagious binomial distributions are 
possibilities,  but  the  latter  makes  implausible 
assumptions about  sequential influence structures 
among congressional  districts and the former is elim- American Political Science Review  Vol. 81 
inated on empirical grounds. 
28.  We  estimate 11$  instead of  0 because it is 
more easily interpreted. Furthermore, because of  the 
invariance property of  maximum-likelihood estima- 
tion (DeGroot 1975, 291-92), the exponentiation of 
the estimate of  lnp may be calculated in order to 
recover the maximum likelihood estimate of  8. 
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